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Abstract 
This paper aims to study the problems and issues of China's relations with ASEAN, which 
has achieved the establishment of ASEAN Economic Community by 2015. Taking into 
consideration the institutional framework constituted by the multiple agreements signed 
between China and ASEAN, how will the development of China-ASEAN relations be 
influenced by increasing economic interdependence between the two? What will be the 
difficulties ahead in enhancing trade and investments? Does promoting economic 
cooperation lead to more mutual trust in the political-strategic arena? China's recent policy 
in developing "One Belt, One Road," and Chinese relations with the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific 
Partnership and their implications to ASEAN will also be examined in this paper. 
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Introduction 
The establishment of ASEAN 
Economic Community (AEC) by 2015, as 
decided by ASEAN leaders in 2007, was 
expected to pave the way for a more in-
depth integration of the economies of the 
ten member states. This paper aims to 
study the prospects of AEC in the context 
of China-ASEAN relations. Not only the 
Chinese perspective regarding the AEC 
will be studied, but also the problems and 
issues of China’s relations with ASEAN 
will be examined. The downturn of global 
economy, the economic slowdown of 
China that used to be one of the motors 
that drove the whole world, the difficult 
recovery of the developed world, and the 
sudden loss of momentum of Brazil, 
Russia, India, China, and South Africa 
(BRICS) in becoming another engine for 
boosting the world economy are all major 
problems that contribute to the global 
recession. They pose significant impact to 
the future of AEC. China’s economy is in 
slowdown, and Xi Jinping has asked for a 
minimum annual growth rate of 6.5 per 
cent until 2020. Although in such 
circumstances China could still offer 
opportunities to Southeast Asian 
countries, one should not underestimate 
the challenges and problems that ASEAN 
has to face resulting from China’s 
economic downturn. 
The political and economic 
relations between ASEAN and China have 
been circumscribed by a series of treaties 
and agreements that constitute the 
institutional framework within which 
their future relations develop. ASEAN in 
the past always wanted to construct 
multilateral frameworks in managing the 
relations with its northern powerful 
neighbor, so that the margin of maneuver 
of China could be restrained. This is what 
a scholar called ASEAN’s ‘omni-
enmeshment’ strategy towards China and 
other major powers (Goh, 2007-08, pp. 
113-157). Before the mid-90s, Beijing 
refused to be ‘bounded’ by the 
international norms or the rules of the 
games internalized by these multilateral 
frameworks, so they chose not to join 
them. Beijing did not wish to be ‘locked’ 
by those multinational frameworks. 
However, after the end of Cold War, 
China aspired to ‘join the world’ and 
integrated into the global capitalist 
system. Since the mid-1990s, China 
changed its policies from refusing to join 
those multilateral frameworks to actively 
participate in them. The pragmatic 
Chinese leaders have then realized that 
from a realist perspective China could try 
to maximize its influence within the 
multilateral institutions. Moreover, if 
Beijing is not satisfied with the 
frameworks or international institutions, it 
could only seek transformation from 
within after it becomes a participating 
member. From a liberalist-institutionalist 
perspective, China could forge ahead the 
development of these international 
institutions basing on the spirit of 
consensus and cooperation, thus 
demonstrating its goodwill. 
In this spirit, China joined the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) as a 
dialogue partner in 1994. The series of 
multilateral institutional frameworks that 
China participates in include the 
Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the 
South China Sea signed in 2002; the 
Framework Agreement on 
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
signed in November 2002 for the 
establishment of Free-Trade Area (FTA) 
by 2010, followed by the Protocol to 
Amend the Framework Agreement 2003 
signed in Bali; the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation in Southeast Asia signed in 
October 2003; the framework agreement 
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on ASEAN-China FTA (ACFTA) that 
came into force in July 2005; the Trade in 
Goods Agreement signed in November 
2004; the Trade in Services Agreement 
signed in January 2007; the Investment 
Agreement signed in August 2007; and 
the Second Agreement of Trade in Goods 
within the Framework Agreement on 
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
signed on 29 October 2010. 
Additionally, there are some new 
institutional agreements in the pipeline, 
including the Code of Conduct of Parties 
in the South China Sea, which is now 
under discussion; the Action Plan to 
Implement the Declaration on China-
ASEAN Strategic Partnership for Peace 
and Prosperity (2016-2020); the China 
ASEAN Treaty on Good Neighborliness, 
Amity and Cooperation; and the Treaty on 
Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free 
Zone. 
The Chinese principles in dealing 
with its relationship with ASEAN can be 
summarized by the followings: good 
neighborliness, mutual trusts, as well as 
bringing harmony, security and 
prosperity to neighbors, as proposed by 
the former Premier Wen Jiabao, and the 
‘New Security Outlook.’ Taking into 
consideration the institutional framework 
constituted by these multiple agreements 
and the principles of Chinese diplomacy, 
how do we see the development of 
ASEAN when the extent of 
interdependence between China and 
ASEAN has been enlarged in the past 
years? Does enhancing economic 
cooperation lead to more mutual trust in 
the political-strategic arena? Are the 
numerous institutional frameworks 
conducive to a more institutionalized 
relationship between China and ASEAN? 
We refer to the concept of complex 
interdependence by Keohane and Nye, 
which is conducive to a better 
understanding among nation-states due to 
their increasing interactions in the 
economic and trade areas as well in social 
and cultural exchanges. According to the 
two authors, interdependence means 
mutual dependence (Keohane and Nye, 
2001, p. 7). Although both actors have to 
measure their benefits against the costs 
incurred during the interactions, 
asymmetry in dependence between the 
two entities is inevitable. Asymmetrical 
interdependence can become a source of 
power for the less dependent actor 
(Keohane and Nye, 2001, pp. 5-17). The 
issue of asymmetrical interdependence 
between ASEAN and China has become a 
serious concern of all ten ASEAN 
members. It is the aim of this paper to 
study whether the Chinese government’s 
perspectives and its policies regarding 
ASEAN have taken into consideration this 
phenomenon of complex 
interdependence. 
This paper will not elaborate on 
the political aspect of China-ASEAN 
relations, which has long been over-
shadowed by the South China Sea 
problem. Beijing seems to separate politics 
from economics, hoping that yangli 
(yielding benefits) to others would 
alleviate political discordance. 
ASEAN-China Trading Relationship: 
Changing Pattern 
In the AEC Blueprint issued in 
2007, it is stipulated that by 2015 when 
AEC is established, the construction of a 
single market and production base will be 
accomplished. There should be free flow 
of goods, services, investments, capital, 
and skilled labor (ASEAN Economic 
Community Blueprint, 2007). It seems that 
the idea and implementation of a regional 
economic community demonstrate a key 
point raised by researchers regarding the 
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implications of globalization. Current 
researches have shown that 
regionalization has been enhanced as a 
result of globalization. Intra-regional 
trade, investments, and labor flow in 
various regions are further promoted as a 
result of economic globalization. China as 
a neighboring great power in phenomenal 
growth definitely plays a role in the 
further regionalization of the Asia-Pacific 
region, by linking East and Southeast 
Asia. What kinds of economic and 
political implications would be 
effectuated especially after the ACFTA 
has come into force? 
Premier Li Keqiang proposed the 
upgrade of ACFTA during the tenth 
China-ASEAN Expo and the China-
ASEAN Business and Investment Summit 
in 2013, 
‚… on further lowering tariff rates, 
cutting non-tariff-related measures, 
launching dialogues for a new round 
of service trade pledge, and pushing 
forward the actual opening-up for 
investment through policies 
concerning access and personnel 
travels, so as to boost the liberalization 
and facilitation of trade and 
investment.‛(Li Keqiang, 2013) 
In October 2013, during the 
ASEAN-China Summit, Li proposed a 
‘2+7 cooperation framework,’ which 
includes a two-point political consensus 
on good neighborliness and mutual trust, 
as well as deepening cooperation for 
mutual benefits. For the seven point 
proposal, it includes: 
1. discussing the signing of the treaty 
of good neighborliness and 
friendly cooperation, 
2. creating an upgraded version of 
the ACFTA, 
3. boosting mutual connectivity 
infrastructure and establishing the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB), 
4. boosting financial cooperation, 
5. carrying out maritime cooperation, 
6. strengthening exchanges in the 
security field, and 
7. promoting people-to-people and 
cultural exchanges (ASEAN-China 
Center). 
Chinese scholars consistently 
indicate that China always tries to ‚give 
more than take‛ so as to benefit the 
developing countries especially its Asian 
neighbors. A Beijing professor stresses 
that, 
‚The principle of ‘give and take’ on 
equal footing defines most of the FTA 
negotiations. However, to show its 
generous spirit to its neighboring 
countries, especially the less 
developed countries, China adheres to 
the strategic principle of ‘giving more 
while taking less,’ or at times only 
‘giving without any taking,’ and 
equality and mutual benefit all the 
time.‛ (Ying Fan, 2012, p. 109) 
As a result of this ‘principle,’ 
China continued to have trade deficits 
with ASEAN countries, importing more 
than exporting, for a relatively long 
period in the past in 2000-2011 (Jiang and 
Cai, 2013, p. 16). During this period, 
exports from ASEAN to China have 
increased much more than the imports 
from China to ASEAN countries 
(Hatakeyama, 2012, p. 105). However, 
during the period of 2012-2014, the 
growth rate of China’s imports from 
ASEAN increased only nominally, from 
24.7 per cent in 2011 to only 1.6 per cent in 
2012, 1.8 per cent in 2013, and 4.4 per cent 
in 2014. But China’s exports to ASEAN 
increased in a significant way, from 23.1 
per cent in 2011, to 20.1 per cent in 2012, 
19.5 per cent in 2013, and 11.3 per cent in 
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2014.2  In 2011, the exports of China to 
ASEAN was valued at US$170 billion, but 
only three years later, in 2014, the value of 
total exports increased to US$271.7 billion. 
On the contrary, in 2011 the imports of 
China from ASEAN were valued at 
US$192.8 billion, but thereafter the value 
of imports remained stagnant and reached 
only US$208.1 billion in 2014. 
So, starting from 2012, ASEAN 
suffers from having trade deficits with 
China. In 2012, the deficit was US$8.5 
billion, but this increased to US$44.7 
billion in 2013, according to the statistics 
of Chinese Ministry of Commerce 
(Salidjanova et al., 2015, p. 5). The trade 
deficit was further increased to $63.6 
billion in 2014 (ASEAN External Trade 
Statistics 2014 and Direction of Trade 
Statistics, IMF, 2015). Is this a result of 
ACFTA, which largely facilitates the 
exports of China, especially its 
mechanical, electrical, and manufactured 
products? 
The party-state in China still plays 
a prominent role in guiding and 
monitoring its national economy. The 
downturn of Chinese economy since 2014 
to a certain extent is related to the 
diminishing market demand in Europe 
and the United States (U.S.), which results 
in the significant reduction of Chinese 
exports to the developed world. With the 
encouragement and assistance provided 
by the state, Chinese enterprises have 
strenuously searched for the expansion of 
external markets for their products. 
ASEAN has been in moderate and 
steady growth, attaining an average 
annual GDP growth of 5.5 per cent 
recently. This is considered to be a 
steadily expanding market especially for 
                                                          
2 Author’s own calculations based on the 
statistics of Chinese Ministry of Commerce. 
the industrial goods. It is obvious that 
China continues to expand its exports of 
machinery and manufactured goods to 
ASEAN, benefitting from the coming into 
force of ACFTA which has reduced the 
tariff to zero for 93 per cent of all the 
products from ASEAN by 1 January 2010. 
However, it should be noted that a large 
number of sensitive products is not 
included in the list of zero tariff. So, in the 
‘upgraded’ version of ACFTA, the 
number of sensitive and highly sensitive 
products should be reduced (Wei Min, 
2015, p. 130). 
On the other hand, has China 
significantly reduced the import of raw 
materials, minerals, fuels, and even 
agricultural products on which ASEAN 
countries largely depend as exports? As 
the prices of these products are relatively 
low in comparison to industrial products, 
even if there might be growth in exports, 
the total value cannot be significantly 
enlarged. What is worse is that the prices 
of these primary materials are still 
suffering from downward trend. 
According to the agreement on trade in 
goods, the tariff-reduced products are 
divided into three categories: normal, 
sensitive, and highly sensitive products. 
The highly sensitive ones, including rice, 
sugar, plant oil, automobiles, and certain 
petro-chemical products, are still under 
tariff protection until 2015. We have to 
wait and see whether abolishing all the 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers to those 
products would boost up the two-way 
trade, or benefit more to one counterpart 
or another. 
ASEAN should enhance its 
competitiveness in such traditional 
products such as food, fisheries, 
agricultural, and forestry commodities. 
ASEAN and China used to be competitors 
in exporting to third countries, as their 
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exports of manufactured goods are quite 
similar. They are also competitors in 
attracting investments. But it seems that at 
least in the production chain they could be 
complementary to each other, as 
enterprises in China are looking to export 
their labor-intensive manufacturing 
industries to Southeast Asia, giving the 
increasingly high cost of labor in China. 
Apart from the structural 
problems in trade as mentioned above, a 
Chinese scholar highlights several major 
insufficiencies of ACFTA. First, the 
favorable policy has not been fully 
utilized by the enterprises, as some of the 
measures to facilitate trading are not yet 
applicable and the transaction costs are 
still high. Second, the degree of openness 
of trade in services is relatively low. The 
openness of sectors like intellectual 
property rights (IPR), government 
procurement, technological, and 
environmental problems has not yet been 
treated. Third, there are still severe legal 
restrictions to financial services and 
economic connectivity, which hamper the 
conditions for economic development 
(Wei Min, 2015, 130). It is obvious that 
ASEAN countries have serious concerns 
regarding the opening up of the market of 
these significant sectors. However, 
opening up the service sectors and 
financial sector, as well as giving 
emphasis on IPR and environment 
concern, are key issues that should be 
considered in the development of the next 
stage of the FTA. 
Investments Opportunities in ASEAN 
From 2012 to 2014, the total 
Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in 
ASEAN reached US$369 billion, out of 
which China’s amounted only to $21.4 
billion, after the European Union (EU), 
Japan, and the U.S., and not much 
different from the value of Hong Kong’s 
investments (US$20.2 billion) (Zhang, 
2015, p. 28, and Statistics of ASEAN, 
2015). However, investments on electricity 
and exploration of raw materials 
constitute 31.7 per cent of the total China’s 
investments, and investments in 
manufacturing industries only reach 13.4 
per cent. The Chinese invest significantly 
in infrastructure, real estate, financial 
services, and service industries. ASEAN 
and China industrial structures are quite 
similar and at the same time competitive, 
as they continue to produce for the 
enterprises of the developed world. 
Recently, some Chinese analysts 
try to promote further interdependence of 
economic relations between ASEAN and 
China through constructing an 
internationalized production network, or 
the so-called ‘vertical specialization.’ 
China aspires to become the source of 
technological invention, center of 
innovation, and research and 
development. If the Chinese enterprises 
succeed in designing their own brands 
and designs, they can establish their own 
system of division of labor in the regional 
value chain through manufacturing the 
products in the neighboring developing 
countries. That is to say, the labor-
intensive production process is 
transferred to ASEAN countries. The 
vertical specialization thus produced 
creates a ‘win-win’ situation in regional 
cooperation, and the products can be sold 
first in China, ASEAN, and other 
developing countries with similar 
demand. This first step is considered to be 
important, because if the newly developed 
industrial powers rely significantly on 
overseas market, this will certainly arouse 
fierce competition from the more 
established industrial powers. It is only at 
the later stage that the Chinese-designed 
successful products can enter the market 
of developed world through linkages to 
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the multinational companies and 
international buyers. It is only at that time 
that the Chinese enterprises are able to 
establish their own system of division of 
labor in the global production and value 
chain. 
On its road to become a global 
economic power, China is aspiring to be 
not only the major supplier of final 
products to the vast Chinese and ASEAN 
markets, but also the center of innovation 
and design of new industrial products. In 
order to achieve this objective, China 
needs to largely improve its ability to 
innovate. China can also assist other Asian 
neighbors to be less reliant on European 
and U.S. markets, as the vast Chinese 
market is growing, and the manufacture 
process in Southeast Asian countries of 
Chinese-designed goods helps to promote 
their economic development. All these are 
instrumental in stabilizing and forging 
ahead the further development of East 
Asian regional economy. Constructing a 
vertical specialization is thus considered 
to be the foundation for China to become 
both the innovator and the recipient of 
final products. If China can design and the 
vast Chinese market can absorb these 
newly designed products with the 
production process shifting to ASEAN, it 
is considered as part of the upgraded 
version of ACFTA (Zhang, 2015, p. 31). 
ASEAN countries benefit from the 
moving of labor intensive industries from 
China to ASEAN countries. In summer 
2015, there was a remarkable decrease of 
foreign currencies reserve in China, from 
$3.99 trillion in June 2014 to $3.21trillion 
in June 2016 (figures from Trading 
Economics). This is due to a decrease in 
renminbi (RMB) savings in exchange for 
foreign currencies and relocation of 
investments from Mainland China to 
Southeast Asia and other parts of Asia by 
a large number of enterprises from 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, and other countries. 
The labor-intensive manufacturers in 
Southern China have been facing increase 
in wages and shortage of labor workers. 
Many factories have been obliged to move 
to Southeast Asian countries like 
Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, and Indonesia, 
and even India. China used to be the 
major recipient of these investments, 
which have their production process in 
the coastal areas of China. So, China was 
the competitor of ASEAN countries for 
those export-oriented investments in the 
past. Now, with the facility provided by 
investment promotion, shifting the 
production to ASEAN will help to sustain 
the development in ASEAN and increase 
employment. 
ASEAN can benefit from the 
affluent middle class that has been 
growing significantly in China. It is 
expected that the middle class will 
‚change consumer lifestyles, thus 
stimulating imports of quality and luxury 
products and services from ASEAN 
countries‛ (Chinvanno, 2015, p. 13). 
However, the slowdown of Chinese 
economy since 2014 has started to pose a 
real challenge for ASEAN exports. 
ASEAN countries should be aware of a 
protracted slowdown in the Chinese 
economy that results in a reduction of 
imports from ASEAN. As a result, 
Southeast Asian countries aim to increase 
domestic demand as well as productivity. 
Intra-ASEAN trade has increased to 24.1 
per cent of ASEAN’s total trade in 2014 
(ASEAN External Trade Statistics, 2014) 
and this should be further promoted in 
the new ten-year strategic plan aiming for 
deeper integration beyond 2015. 
Since the signing of the agreement 
on trade in services, the financial, tourism, 
information technology, education, and 
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logistics sectors have benefitted. However, 
even Chinese scholars stress that the 
Chinese investments should not focus on 
speculative profit-making activities like 
real estate development. They should 
learn from the Japanese experience in 
investing in public transport, education, 
and technology skill training in order to 
assist the host country in establishing a 
solid foundation for further development. 
China and ASEAN should cooperate to 
produce the so-called ‘regional public 
goods’ catering for the needs of ASEAN 
countries. This is considered as crucial in 
order to 'earn the trust, improve China’s 
image and appeasing effects‛ among the 
neighboring countries. This demands not 
only financial and technical aid from 
Beijing, but the latter should be more 
thoughtful in offering assistance in 
education, medicine, and social security 
(Wang and Zhang, 2015, p. 31). 
China has set up a ‚US$15 billion 
credit facility and a US$10 billion China-
ASEAN Investment Cooperation Fund 
with a focus on infrastructure and 
connectivity, thus helping to realize the 
ASEAN community by 2015‛ 
(Soerakoesoemah, 2012, p. 19). China is 
raising US$3 billion for the second stage of 
China-ASEAN Investment Cooperation 
Fund, but so far the usefulness of this 
fund has not been very clear (Wei Min, 
2015, p. 139). 
China’s Grand Strategy of ‘One Belt, 
One Road’ 
During the visit of Xi Jinping to 
Kazakhstan in September 2013, he 
proposed the idea of jointly constructing 
the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt.’ Two 
months later when he visited Indonesia in 
November 2013, he proposed the idea and 
policy of constructing the ‘Maritime Silk 
Road.’ Many scholars in China are 
actively engaging in justifying the 
necessity of this policy, searching for the 
essence of its meaning, and finding ways 
to implement it, whereas scholars outside 
China want to examine the geopolitical 
and geo-economic reasons behind the 
launching this policy and its implications. 
China has already committed 
US$100 billion in October 2014 for the 
AIIB and contributed US$40 billion in 
November 2014 for the ‘Silk Road Fund.’ 
Beijing also committed to establish the 
‘New Development Bank’ with the BRICS. 
The Greater Mekong Sub-region is 
considered to be the first testing ground 
for the so-called economic integrative 
development. All these banks serve to 
finance those projects of infrastructural 
development, including railway, highway, 
sea transportation, aviation, electricity, 
water, as well as real estates, so as to 
facilitate the exchanges of personnel, 
trade, capital, technology, and agricultural 
products. China has already started the 
extension of its electricity grid to 
Southeast Asian countries, through the so-
called ‘ASEAN Inter-connected Power 
Grid’ (Report on the Transfer of Electricity 
from Southern China to ASEAN 
Countries). Now, the China Southern 
Power Grid company has already 
supplied electricity to Laos, Myanmar, 
and Vietnam.3  This is in reality a result of 
the over-capacity in the production of 
electricity in China, as well as the slow 
growth or even reduction of electricity 
consumption in various provinces as a 
result of the Chinese economic downturn 
since 2014. 
There are two economic factors 
that play a part in the formulation of this 
                                                          
3 China has two electricity grids: the National 
Power Grid and the Southern Power Grid. The 
latter supplies electricity to five provinces: 
Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan, Guizhou, and 
Hainan. 
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policy. First, the abundant foreign 
currency reserves of China, which 
amounted to a maximum of $3.99 trillion 
in June 2014 but dropped to $3.21 trillion 
in June 2016 due to the outflow of foreign 
capital, has always been a problem for the 
financial situation of China. In the past, it 
was constantly a source of pressure for the 
appreciation of RMB. Now, Beijing is 
suffering from the pressure for 
depreciation. How to make the best use of 
the foreign currencies is a difficult issue, 
as investments in wealthy developed 
world like Europe and the U.S. are usually 
risky. So, buying U.S. bonds is the 
ultimate outcome, but lending money to 
the U.S. will curtail losses to China if the 
U.S. dollar is devalued. By the ‘One Belt, 
One Road’ policy, China can lend money 
through the AIIB or Silk Road Fund to 
Southeast Asian states, which will then 
make use of the loan to improve their 
infrastructural development. 
Second, any infrastructural 
development will make use of cement, 
iron and steel, aluminium, chemicals, and 
heavy machinery. All these sectors in 
China are in a state of over-capacity. The 
prices of all these minerals and 
commodities have dropped significantly. 
The numerous factories that are set idle 
desperately need new markets as the 
Chinese market is over-saturated. For 
every city of China, whether big or small, 
there must be several or over a dozen 
newly developed regions outside the 
cities. All these so-called ‘ghost cities’ are 
able to house millions of people, as 
proclaimed by an expert on urban 
development in a recent conference held 
in Beijing. Now, China wants to help the 
neighboring developing countries to build 
infrastructure. They obtain the loan from 
China then make use of the loan to buy 
Chinese materials, expertise, and 
technology, that is to say, to keep the 
Chinese factories that produce steel, 
cement, and even locomotive working. 
However, we need to consider 
whether these developing countries are 
able to pay back the capital investments 
that they borrow from China. The capital 
investment of billions of US dollars in 
building a railway depends on the loan, 
but is the country able to generate enough 
profits from the operation of the railway 
so that it could pay back the loan? This is 
a legitimate question that Chinese 
decision-makers must clarify. If some 
countries are not able to pay within the 
designated period, will China exempt 
their debts, as it has done in the past in 
dissolving the debts of the poorest African 
countries? 
One recent example can be 
demonstrated by the Laotian railway built 
by China. The two countries signed an 
agreement in 2015 in Beijing on the 
construction and operation of a 418 km 
railway in Laos. The total investment is 
RMB40 billion yuan. The proportion of 
China’s share is 70 per cent while Laos’ is 
30 per cent, which means Laos has to 
contribute RMB12 billion yuan (Ming Pao, 
2015, p. A23). Since the railway will link 
up China’s domestic railway network 
with Thailand’s and Malaysia’s in the 
future, it can be regarded as a ‘political 
project,’ whereas the profitability of the 
railways seems to be doubtful but it is of 
secondary importance. 
If China is able to construct the 
high-speed railways4 that connect China 
                                                          
4 It should be specified that the relatively high-
speed trains that run for 200 km per hour are 
called ‘dongche’ (dynamic trains) in Chinese, 
while those extra high-speed trains that run 
for more than 350 km per hour are called 
‘gaotie’ (high-speed trains). The former can use 
the ordinary conventional railway, while the 
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to Europe via the numerous countries in 
Central Asia, Western Asia, and Eastern 
Europe, the whole railway system 
together with the communication, signal, 
and software system designed by China 
will be utilized by all the countries 
concerned. This is a significant 
achievement of China that brings 
remarkable political and economic 
implications. During the past 36 years of 
reform and open door period, China eyes 
on Western assistance in providing 
capital, expertise, and technology. Now, 
geopolitically speaking, China pays 
attention to the countries in its south and 
west and endeavors to modify the 
landscape of those countries through 
China’s economic power. 
The RCEP and China’s Reactions to the 
U.S.-Dominated Trans-Pacific 
Partnership 
Apart from its grand initiative of 
One Belt, One Road, Beijing seems to be 
eager to play a leading role in the ASEAN 
initiative of Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP), which was 
launched in 2012, that brings together the 
ten ASEAN members states with the six 
states that have free trade agreements 
with ASEAN, including China, Japan, 
India, South Korea, Australia, and New 
Zealand. Fifteen rounds of negotiation 
have covered areas in trading in goods 
and services, investment, IPR, economic 
and technical cooperation, dispute 
resolution, and legal issues. Key concerns 
include lowering tariffs especially in 
agricultural sector, an important issue for 
Japan that is concerned with opening its 
                                                                                    
latter are much more demanding 
technologically, requiring an isolated and 
specially constructed railway. However, in the 
Chinese publicities regarding the exportation 
of train technology, the word ‘gaotie’ is always 
used. 
agricultural market. Another concern is to 
push ahead investment opportunities that 
stronger powers such as Japan and China 
are enthusiastic to achieve. The RCEP is 
considered as another grand design for 
China in orchestrating the establishment 
of an upgraded FTA in the Asia-Pacific 
region, in competition to the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) led by Washington. 
Since the new U.S. President Donald 
Trump has already mentioned his will to 
dismantle the TPP before his advent to 
power given his protectionist stance, 
Asian countries including even Japan are 
looking at RCEP in considering their 
future in the regional cooperation efforts. 
The original proposal of four small 
states – Singapore, Brunei, New Zealand, 
and Chile – which largely rely on trade for 
their economic development, was 
baptized in 2005 as the ‘Trans-Pacific 
Strategic and Economic Partnership.’ They 
aimed to promote free trade ‘at a higher 
level.’ They wished to draw attention to 
the necessity of ‘upgrading’ free trade. 
However, facing the difficulties in 
negotiations within World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and the 
predominance of great powers, what they 
could do was rather limited. When the 
U.S. took over the proposal after the 
advent of President Barack Obama to 
power and changed its name to TPP in 
2009, Washington sought the approval of 
other countries in creating a ‘new’ FTA 
that has to take into consideration some 
new conditions in relation to IPR, labor 
rights, transparency in decision-making, 
finance, e-commerce, private property, 
and environmental protection and 
conservation. Even for the traditional 
areas like commodity trade and trade in 
services, the TPP set a higher standard. 
Zero tariff will be enforced for all 
products, and for the market access in 
services trade, the TPP is very liberal, 
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allowing the ‘pre-establishment national 
treatment,’ plus most-favored-nation and 
exception clause (Wu and Qu, 2014, p. 67). 
The TPP agreement, signed on 5 
October 2015, marked a significant victory 
of the U.S. in determining the ‘rules of the 
games’ in international trade in the future. 
The TPP can be considered as the creation 
of new norms and regulations in 
international trade, led by the largest 
economy (the U.S.) and the third largest 
economy (Japan) for the further 
development of regional economy (Ta 
Kung Pao, 2015, p. A24). The ‘high 
standard’ in IPR, workers conditions, 
environmental control, and trade in 
services is a manifestation of the U.S. new 
FTA. For instance, in IPR, the usual FTA 
requests members to abide by the ‘Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) agreement’ as stipulated in 
the WTO, but the TPP sets a higher 
standard. The U.S. has a very strong 
competitive edge in technological 
innovation and knowledge economy. The 
high standard in IPR would help the U.S. 
in maintaining its superiority in this area 
and safeguarding its interests in 
technological transfer and patents trade. 
However, this might inhibit the least 
developed countries in acquiring 
technology at a low cost. The regulations 
on labor rights as well as environmental 
conditions are seen by Chinese analysts as 
a kind of pretexts used by the U.S. 
administration in imposing trade 
sanctions to least developed countries in 
the future. They would obstruct the 
exports of Chinese products. The principle 
of non-discrimination is adopted by the 
TPP in the regulations on government 
procurement. This is also regarded by 
Chinese analysts as a means to obstruct 
Chinese government’s actions to buttress 
its state enterprises in order to support its 
crucial key industries (Wu and Qu, 2014, 
p. 71). 
Though China would not suffer 
much from not joining the TPP in the 
short term, the TPP actually constrains the 
status and influence of China in fostering 
regional economic cooperation. Chinese 
economists believe that the accession of 
Japan to TPP while China is out of TPP 
would adversely affect the Chinese 
economy, as trade would then shift 
towards the twelve member states of TPP 
with tariffs for all commodities reduced to 
zero. However, for the sake of upgrading 
Chinese status and influence in East Asian 
economic cooperation, Beijing opts for 
‘10+3’ in order to counter-balance the 
negative effects incurred upon China by 
the U.S.-dominated TPP, which is part of 
the American strategy of ‘Rebalancing’ 
and ‘Pivot to Asia.’ Beijing also thinks that 
the TPP complicates the great power 
relationship in the Asia-Pacific region, 
especially in China’s bilateral relationship 
with Japan, ASEAN, Korea, and Russia, 
since the TPP would further reinforce the 
relationship between the U.S. and its 
military allies in the region. 
It seems that China opts for an 
‘East Asian Strategy’ rather than an ‘Asia-
Pacific Strategy,’ as the former yields 
more ‘spillover’ effects on the member 
countries. Among the strategic choices for 
China, the order for China’s choices is in 
the following sequence: 10+1 > China-
Japan-Korea > 10+3 > 10+6 (RCEP) > Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
(Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific 
[FTAAP]) > TPP (Wu and Qu, 2014, p. 74). 
Meanwhile, the most important task for 
China is to establish an upgraded version 
of ACFTA, which means reduction of 
tariffs and trade barriers for sensitive 
products; enhancing Chinese investments 
in infrastructure, water and electricity, 
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telecommunication, and raw materials; as 
well as promoting trade in services such 
as financial services and cooperation (Wei 
Min, 2015, p. 131). The next major task is 
to accelerate the negotiation of FTA for 
China-Japan-Korea, then 10+3, and the 
negotiation of bilateral FTA with other 
regional powers such as Korea, Australia, 
Brunei, Malaysia, and Vietnam. 
Both Japan and the U.S. have to 
sacrifice in order to demonstrate their 
goodwill for the establishment of TPP. 
The Japanese government has to make 
sacrifice regarding opening up their 
agricultural market. The self-sufficiency 
rate of agricultural products in Japan 
would be reduced from 40 per cent to 13 
per cent, and, with the massive influx of 
foreign agricultural products, the 
agricultural population would probably 
be reduced by 3.5 million.  The U.S. 
government has make sacrifice regarding 
its pharmaceutical industries, in which 
they have to shorten the length of their 
patents for new medicines from twelve 
years to eight years. 
China was not invited to the 
negotiation on TPP, and it will not be able 
to fulfill some of the requirements in the 
near future. One requirement is obviously 
targeted against the Chinese state 
enterprises. The monopolization of key 
industries in China by the giant state 
enterprises, behind which is the state 
power, is against the ‘spirit’ of free trade 
according to the TPP. The regulations of 
TPP require that state enterprises should 
not enjoy any special privileges, so the key 
industries that are monopolized by the 
Chinese state enterprises, such as chemical 
engineering, steel, petroleum, energy, 
minerals, banking and finance, logistics, 
and telecommunication, would ‘suffer’ in 
the eyes of Chinese analysts. Another 
condition set by TPP is also targeted at 
China, which are ‚new rules governing 
the free flow of data, privacy and cyber-
security … and bans a swath of practices 
used by China and other countries to 
protect her local technology companies‛ 
(Donnan, 2015, p. 2). This is obviously set 
against the Chinese hackers stealing 
commercial and technological secrets from 
the U.S. 
As a superpower, the U.S. still tries 
to safeguard its leadership position in 
deciding the so-called rules of the games 
(or international norms) in international 
trade and investments. If China wishes to 
enter the TPP, it has to make significant 
domestic reforms so as to abide by the 
new international norms. The TPP can 
thus be considered as a useful political 
instrument of Washington to foster 
fundamental changes within China. 
Nevertheless, it should be emphasized 
that higher standard on workers’ rights 
and protection, better protection of IPR, 
and environmental conservation should 
be regarded as the major trends in 
economic globalization, and it is also in 
the interest of China to gradually 
implement a higher standard in these 
regards. Though it is clear that 
Washington wants to make use of TPP to 
stimulate China for further domestic 
reforms in order to fulfill the conditions 
laid down by the U.S. – just like what the 
U.S. did in the past in fostering domestic 
legal, financial, and economic reforms in 
China in order to become a member of 
WTO – it is imperative for China for its 
own sake to modify its economic structure 
and to upgrade its industries. So, the TPP 
setting a higher standard in many ways 
can be beneficial to China if the standard 
laid down will be conducive to further 
restructuring of Chinese economy. 
Interestingly, this argument is indeed 
echoed by Chinese economists (Wu and 
Qu, 2014, p. 76). 
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It seems that ASEAN is interested 
in signing bilateral FTA with regional 
powers by maximizing its own interests 
through the strategy of balancing in 
between the great powers. ASEAN has 
four members in the TPP. How the TPP is 
related to RCEP, FTAAP, and other 
bilateral FTAs and how they play a part in 
influencing regional economic integration 
remain to be studied. It is nevertheless 
certain that maneuvering in between the 
greatest powers in a skillful manner can 
render the maximum benefits for ASEAN. 
Establishing an FTA with China enables 
all the members of ASEAN to benefit from 
the vast Chinese market and attract 
Chinese investments, while the more 
prepared members are now opting for an 
upgraded FTA – the TPP – with the U.S. 
and Japan. This later can then help to 
counterbalance the possible over reliance 
on China from both the geopolitical and 
geo-economic perspectives. 
Conclusion 
As a Thai scholar has noted, ‚the 
problem for China … is that its 
relationship with ASEAN lacks strategic 
trust due to lingering security concerns, 
while prospects for joint economic 
development are limited by ASEAN’s fear 
of domination by its larger neighbor‛ 
(Parameswaran, 2013, p. 12).  ASEAN 
‚may worry that being overly dependent 
on China economically would allow 
Beijing to use its dominance to undermine 
their foreign policy autonomy‛ 
(Parameswaran, 2013, p. 11). 
However, in the cases of Taiwan 
and Hong Kong, by ‘yangli,’ what the 
Chinese authorities wish to achieve is that 
‘rendered profits’ will succeed in winning 
the hearts of people, that is, economic 
integration will lead to political 
integration. In reality, the Chinese 
practice, or malpractice, does not succeed 
in winning the hearts of the people in 
Taiwan or Hong Kong; rather, the 
contrary is true. The massive inflow of 
Chinese capital might modify the 
economic landscape and structure, 
fostering the dominating position of the 
Chinese capital. If the Chinese capital 
dominates, political domination is a 
natural corollary. This is the basic reason 
why the Taiwan students fought against 
the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement 
in the spring of 2014. 
It is true that between China and 
its neighbors, economic interdependence 
is the growing trend that is inevitable. 
However, if the interdependence is 
‘asymmetric’ – meaning that one side 
benefits more than its counterpart, the 
partner country will be skeptical of the 
real intention of the bigger power, 
resulting in the loss of political trust. The 
reason why China is interested in dealing 
with its neighbors on a bilateral basis 
perhaps is due to the underlying logic of 
‘asymmetry.’ So, Beijing should be aware 
of the national sentiments of ASEAN 
countries regarding their fear of 
domination and be cautious of any 
economic endeavors given the possible 
political and social implications. 
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